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Abstract
We initiate the study of an interesting aspect of sponsored search advertising, namely the conse-
quences of broad match- a feature where an ad of an advertiser can be mapped to a broader range of
relevant queries, and not necessarily to the particular keyword(s) that ad is associated with. In spite of its
unanimously believed importance, this aspect has not been formally studied yet, perhaps because of the
inherent difficulty involved in formulating a tractable framework that can yield meaningful conclusions.
In this paper, we provide a natural and reasonable framework that allows us to make definite statements
about the economic outcomes of broad match.
Starting with a very natural setting for strategies available to the advertisers, and via a careful look
through the algorithmic lens, we first propose solution concepts for the game originating from the strate-
gic behavior of advertisers as they try to optimize their budget allocation across various keywords.
Next, we consider two broad match scenarios based on factors such as information asymmetry be-
tween advertisers and the auctioneer (i.e. the search engine company), and the extent of auctioneer’s
control on the budget splitting. In the first scenario, the advertisers have the full information about broad
match and relevant parameters, and can reapportion their own budgets to utilize the extra information;
in particular, the auctioneer has no direct control over budget splitting. We show that, the same broad
match may lead to different equilibria, one leading to a revenue improvement, whereas another to a rev-
enue loss. This leaves the auctioneer in a dilemma - whether to broad-match or not, and consequently
leaves him with a computational problem of predicting which broad matches will provably lead to rev-
enue improvement. This motivates us to consider another broad match scenario, where the advertisers
have information only about the current scenario, i.e., without any broad-match, and the allocation of
the budgets unspent in the current scenario is in the control of the auctioneer. Perhaps not surprisingly,
we observe that if the quality of broad match is good, the auctioneer can always improve his revenue by
judiciously using broad match. Thus, information seems to be a double-edged sword for the auctioneer.
Further, we also discuss the effect of both broad match scenarios on social welfare.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The importance of understanding the various aspects of sponsored search advertising(SSA) is now well
known. Indeed, this advertising framework has been studied extensively in recent years from algorithmic[12,
6, 13, 18], game-theoretic[5, 22, 1, 9, 3, 4, 11], learning-theoretic[7, 24, 19] perspectives, as well as, from
the viewpoint of emerging diversification in the internet economy[20, 21]. Specifically, among others, these
studies include important aspects such as (i) the design of mechanisms for optimizing the revenue of the
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auctioneer, (ii) budget optimization problem of an advertiser, (iii) analyzing the bidding behavior of adver-
tisers in the auction of a keyword query, (iv) learning the Click-Through-Rates and (v) the role of for-profit
mediators. In the present paper, our goal is to initiate the study of yet another interesting aspect of SSA,
namely the consequences of broad match. Despite its unanimously believed importance, to the best of our
knowledge, this aspect has not been formally studied yet, probably because of the hardness in employing a
proper framework for such an study. Our main aim in this paper is to attempt to provide such a framework.
In the rest part of this section, we start by an informal introduction to broad match, then while establishing
the need of a framework to study broad match we provide a glimpse of the present work.
1.1 What is Broad Match?
In SSA format, each advertiser has a set of keywords relevant to her products and a daily budget that she
wants to spend on these keywords. Further, for each of these keywords she has a true value associated with
it that she derives when a user clicks on her ad corresponding to that keyword, and based on this true value
she reports her bid to the search engine company (i.e. the auctioneer) to indicate the maximum amount she
is willing to pay for a click. When a user queries for a keyword, the auctioneer runs an auction among all the
advertisers interested in that keyword whose budget is not over yet. The advertisers winning in this auction
are allocated an ad slot each, determined according to the auction’s allocation rule and an advertiser is
charged, whenever the user clicks on her ad, an amount determined according to the auction’s payment rule.
In this way, for each of the advertisers, each of her ads is matched to queries of the particular keyword(s)
that ad is associated with.
Broad Match is a feature where an ad of an advertiser can be mapped to a broader range of relevant
queries, and not necessarily to the particular keyword(s) that ad is associated with. Such relevant queries
could be possible variations of the associated keyword or could even correspond to a completely different
keyword which is conceptually related to the associated keyword. For example, the variations of keyword
“Scuba” could include “Scuba diving”, “Scuba gear”, “Scuba shops in Los Angeles” etc and conceptually
related keywords could include “Snorkeling”, “under water photography” etc. Similarly, for the keyword
“internet advertising”, the variations could include “banner advertising”, “PPC advertising”, “advertising
on the internet”, “keyword advertising”, “online advertising” etc, and conceptually related keywords could
include “adword”, “adsense” etc; for the keyword “horse race”, the variations could include “horse rac-
ing tickets”, “horse race betting”, “online horse racing” etc, and a conceptually related keyword could be
“thoroughbred”.
1.2 The Need of a Framework to Study Broad Match
To study the effect of incorporating broad match on macroscopic quantities such as revenue of the auctioneer,
social value etc, compared to the scenario without broad match, we must consider the interaction among
various keywords. We must take into account the changes in the bidding behavior of advertisers for specific
keyword queries, as well as, the effect of changes in their budget allocation across various keywords. As
we mentioned earlier, the incentive properties of query specific keyword auction is well analyzed in articles
such as[5, 22, 1, 9, 3, 4, 11]. Further, the budget optimization problem of an advertiser, that is to spend
the budget across various keywords in an optimal manner given quantities such as keyword specific cost-
per-clicks, expected number of clicks, and payoffs as a function of bid, has also been studied under various
models[6, 13, 18]. However, the incentive constraints originating from such budget optimizing strategic
behavior of advertisers has not been formally studied yet. In particular, there is no proposed solution concept
pertinent for predicting the stable behavior of advertisers in this game[2]. On the other hand, for the analysis
of the effect of incorporating broad match, it becomes inevitable to have such a solution concept, that
is a notion of equilibrium behavior, under which we can compare the quantities such as revenue of the
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auctioneer, social value etc, for the two scenarios one with the broad match and the one without it at their
respective equilibrium points.
1.3 Our Results
Our first goal in this paper is to attempt to provide a reasonable solution concept for the game originating
from the strategic behavior of advertisers as they try to optimize their budget allocation/splitting across
various keywords. We realize that without some reasonable restrictions on the set of available strategies to
the advertisers, it is a much harder task to achieve[2]. To this end, we consider a very natural setting for
available strategies- (i) first split/allocate the budget across various keywords and then (ii) play the keyword
query specific bidding/auction game as long as you have budget left over for that keyword when that query
arrives -thereby dividing the overall game in to two stages. In the spirit of [5, 22] wherein the query specific
keyword auction is modeled as a static one shot game of complete information despite its repeated nature in
practice, we model the budget splitting too as a static one shot game of complete information because if the
budget splitting and bidding process ever stabilize, advertisers will be playing static best responses to their
competitors’ strategies.
Now, with this one shot complete information game modeling, the most natural solution concept to con-
sider is pure Nash equilibrium. However, in our case, it seems to be a very strong notion of equilibrium
behavior if we look through our algorithmic glasses1 because, as we argue in the paper, an advertiser’s
problem of choosing her best response is computationally hard. Consequently, we first consider a weaker
solution concept based on local Nash equilibrium. We show that there is a strongly polynomial time (poly-
nomial in number of advertisers, keywords and ad slots and not the volume of queries or total daily budget)
algorithm to compute an advertiser’s locally best response. This notion of equilibrium, which we call broad
match equilibrium (BME), is defined in terms of marginal payoff (or bang-per-buck) for various keywords
corresponding to a budget splitting, and looks similar to the definition of user equilibrium/Waldrop equilib-
rium in routing and transportation science literature[17]. Further, there is a strongly poly-time algorithm to
compute an advertiser’s approximate best response as well. Therefore, the approximate Nash equilibrium
(ǫ-NE) is also reasonable in our setting. Indeed, all the conclusions of our work hold true irrespective of
which of these two solution concepts we adopt, the BME or the ǫ-NE.
In the full information setting, under the solution concept of BME we obtain several observations by
explicitly constructing examples. In particular, even with this natural and reasonably restricted notion of
stable behavior, we observe that same broad match might lead to different BMEs where one BME might
lead to an improvement in the revenue of the auctioneer over the scenario without broad match while the
other to a loss in revenue, even when the quality of broad-match is very good. This leaves the auctioneer in
a dilemma about whether he should broad-match or not. If he could somehow predict which choice of broad
match lead to a revenue improvement for him and which not, he could potentially choose the ones leading to
a revenue improvement. Further, the same examples imply the same conclusions under the solution concept
of ǫ-NE. This brings forth one of the big questions left open in this paper, that is of efficiently computing a
BME / ǫ-NE, if one exists, given a choice of broad match.
Note that in the above scenario of broad match, the advertisers had all the relevant information about the
broad match, and the control of budget splitting is in the hands of respective advertisers. We also explore
another broad match scenario where the advertisers have information only about the scenario without broad-
match, and they allow the auctioneer to spend their excess budgets (i.e the budget unspent in the scenario
without broad match), in whatever way the auctioneer wants, in the hope of potential improvements in their
payoffs. Perhaps not surprisingly, we observe that if the quality of broad match is good, the auctioneer
1Efficient computability is an important modeling prerequisite for solution concepts. In the words of Kamal Jain, “If your laptop
cannot find it, neither can the market”[14].
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can always improve his revenue. Thus, information seems to be a double-edged sword for the auctioneer.
Further, we also discuss the effect of both broad match scenarios on social welfare.
1.4 Organization of the Paper
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the formal setting of the query specific
keyword auctions. In Section 3, we define Broad Match Graph, a weighted bipartite graph between the set of
advertisers and the set of keywords, which serves as the basic back bone in terms of which we formulate all
our notions and results. In Section 4, we present the defining characteristics of the two broad match scenarios
studied in this paper, in terms of factors such as information asymmetry and the extent of auctioneer’s control
on the budget splitting. The Section 5 is devoted to the study of broad match scenario in the full information
setting where the auctioneer has no direct control on the budget splitting. This is essentially the most
contributing part of this paper wherein first we appropriately model the game originating from the strategic
behavior of advertisers as they try to optimize their budget allocation/splitting across various keywords,
then we propose appropriate solution concepts for this game, and finally study the effect of broad match
under this proposed framework. In Section 6, we study the other broad match scenario, where advertisers
do not have full information about the broad match being performed and the auctioneer partially controls
the budget splitting. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude with potential directions for future work motivated
by the present paper.
2 Keyword Auctions
There are K slots to be allocated among N (≥ K) bidders (i.e. the advertisers). A bidder i has a true
valuation vi (known only to the bidder i) for the specific keyword and she bids bi. The expected click
through rate (CTR) of an ad put by bidder i when allocated slot j has the form CTRi,j = γjei i.e. separable
in to a position effect and an advertiser effect. γj’s can be interpreted as the probability that an ad will be
noticed when put in slot j and it is assumed that γj > γj+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K and γj = 0 for j > K . ei
can be interpreted as the probability that an ad put by bidder i will be clicked on if noticed and is referred to
as the relevance of bidder i. The payoff/utility of bidder i when given slot j at a price of p per-click is given
by eiγj(vi − p) and they are assumed to be rational agents trying to maximize their payoffs.
As of now, Google as well as Yahoo! use schemes closely modeled as RBR(rank by revenue) with
GSP(generalized second pricing). The bidders are ranked in the decreasing order of eibi and the slots are
allocated as per this ranks. For simplicity of notation, assume that the ith bidder is the one allocated slot i
according to this ranking rule, then i is charged an amount equal to ei+1bi+1
ei
per-click. This mechanism has
been extensively studied in recent years[5, 9, 22, 11]. The solution concept that is widely adopted to study
this auction game is a refinement of Nash equilibrium independently proposed by Varian[22] and Edelman et
al[5]. Under this refinement, the bidders have no incentive to change to another positions even at the current
price paid by the bidders currently at that position. Edelmen et al [5] calls it locally envy-free equilibria and
argue that such an equilibrium arises if agents are raising their bids to increase the payments of those above
them, a practice which is believed to be common in actual keyword auctions. Varian[22] called it symmetric
Nash equilibria(SNE) and provided some empirical evidence that the Google bid data agrees well with the
SNE bid profile. In particular, an SNE bid profile bi’s satisfy
(γi − γi+1)vi+1ei+1 + γi+1ei+2bi+2 ≤ γiei+1bi+1
≤ (γi − γi+1)viei + γi+1ei+2bi+2 (1)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Now, recall that in the RBR with GSP mechanism, the bidder i pays an amount
ei+1bi+1
ei
per-click, therefore the expected payment i makes per-impression is γiei ei+1bi+1ei = γiei+1bi+1.
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Thus the best SNE bid profile for advertisers (worst for the auctioneer) is minimum bid profile possible
according to Equation 1 and is given by
γiei+1bi+1 =
K∑
j=i
(γj − γj+1)vj+1ej+1 (2)
and therefore, the revenue of the auctioneer at this minimum SNE is
K∑
i=1
γiei+1bi+1 =
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=i
(γj − γj+1)vj+1ej+1 (3)
=
K∑
i=1
(γj − γj+1)jvj+1ej+1.
3 Broad Match Graph
In this section, we set up a basic backbone to study the dynamics of bidding across various related keywords,
in the sponsored search advertising, via a bipartite graph between the set of bidders (i.e. the advertisers) and
the set of keywords with the parameters (N,M,K,S = (si,j), B = (Bi), V = (Vj)) as follows.
• Keywords: M is the number of keywords in consideration. We will denote the set of keywords
{1, 2, . . . ,M} by M. Further, Vj is the total (expected) volume of queries for the keyword j for a given
period of time which we call a “day”. These may not be all the keywords a particular advertiser may
be interested in bidding on but one of the sets of keywords which are related by some category/concept
that the advertiser is interested in bidding on e.g. for selling the same product or service.
• Bidders/Advertisers: N is the total number of bidders interested in the above M keywords. We will
denote the set of bidders {1, 2, . . . , N} by N. Further, Bi is the total budget of the bidder i for a “day”
that she wants to spend on these keywords.
• Slots: K is the maximum number of ad-slots available. Let L be the number of advertisers with
sufficient budgets when a particular query of a keyword j arrives then for that query of j, the slot-
clickability (i.e. the position based CTRs) are defined to be γl corresponding to a slot l for l ≤
min{K,L} and zero otherwise2.
• Valuation Matrix: Let vi,j be the true value of the bidder i for the keyword j and ei,j be her rele-
vance2 (quality score) for j. We call theN×M matrix S, with (i, j)th entries defined as si,j = vi,jei,j ,
as the valuation matrix. For a keyword j for which a bidder i has no interest or is not allowed to bid,
si,j := −∞. In the revenue/efficiency/payoffs calculations at SNE, it is enough to know si,j and not
the vi,j and ei,j separately, therefore, in this paper we will often refer only to si,j and not vi,j and ei,j
individually.
• Broad Match Graph (BMG): Given instance parameters (N,M,K,S,B, V ), a bipartite graph G =
(N,M,E), with vertex sets N and M and edge set E = {(i, j) : i ∈ N, j ∈ M, si,j > 0}, is
constructed. Further, each edge (i, j) ∈ E is associated with a weight si,j . The weight of a node
i ∈ N is Bi and that of a node j ∈ M is Vj . Furthermore, an i ∈ N will be called an ad-node and an
j ∈ M will be referred to as a keyword-node.
2We assume that the clicks-through-rates(CTRs) are separable.
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• Extension of a BMG: A BMG G′ = (N,M,E′ ) for the instance (N,M,K,S′ , B, V ) is called an
extension of a BMG G = (N,M,E) for the instance (N,M,K,S,B, V ) if E ⊂ E′ and s′i,j = si,j for
all (i, j) ∈ E. Interpretation is that the instance represented by an extension is more broader in the
sense that an advertiser has a choice to be and could be matched to a larger set of keywords. Indeed,
we will formally refer an extension G′ = (N,M,E′ ) to be a broad-match for its base G = (N,M,E).
Note that, without loss of generality, this definition of extension (broad-match) captures the possibility
that new keywords are introduced. This is because we can always think that a new keyword to be
included was already there as an isolated node and now we are creating only edges.
4 Information Asymmetry, Budget Splitting and Two Broad Match Scenar-
ios
Depending on how much information the auctioneer (i.e. the search engine company) provides to advertisers
about various parameters, such as CTRs, conversion rates, volume of queries etc, related to the keywords
and depending on who splits the daily budget across the various keywords, the auctioneer or the advertisers,
we consider the following two scenarios for broad matching:
I) AdBM: Advertisers Controlled Broad Match, extra information to advertisers, advertisers split their
budgets.
II) AcBM : Auctioneer Controlled Broad Match, no extra information to advertisers, auctioneer splits
the budget.
Formally, let G′ = (N,M,E′ ) be the broad-match for G = (N,M,E), then we characterize these two
scenarios of broad-match based on the following factors(ref. Table 1):
• Information asymmetry: Of course, advertisers already have all the information about the BMG G.
That is, they all know their CTRs, conversion rates, volume of queries, who participates how long,
spends and bids how much on which keyword, across various keywords they are bidding currently.
It is the knowledge about these quantities for the part of the extension G′ which is not in G i.e.
along the edges in E′ \ E that advertisers may or may not be aware of depending on whether the
auctioneer provides this information to them or not3. In AcBM scenario, advertisers do not have this
information. At most what they know is that there is some broad-match the auctioneer is performing
and they can effect the dynamics on the extension G′ only passively through their bidding behavior on
G4. In AdBM scenario, there is no such asymmetry in information. Advertisers know (or are rather
informed by the auctioneer) all the information about E′ \ E.
• Extent of auctioneer’s control on the budget splitting: In AdBM scenario, the auctioneer has no
control over the budget splitting. It is upto the advertisers to decide which keywords they want to
participate in and how much budget they want to spend on each of those keywords. Thus, the budget
splitting of an advertiser, across various keywords she is connected to in G′ , is in her own control
and she can split her budget so as to maximize her total payoff across those keywords. As discussed
in section 1.2, this brings in another layer of incentive constraints from advertisers besides choosing
3Of course, to learn these relevance scores there might be a cost incurred by the auctioneer in the short run, nevertheless if the
broad-match quality is good, this cost will generally be minimal.
4As we know, in the sponsored search advertising, advertisers effectively derive their valuations from the rate of conversion
which might very well change by broad match and accordingly bidders may adjust their true values (and consequently the bids)
due to broad match. This might lead to another level of cost to the auctioneer due to uncertainty in performing broad-match.
Nevertheless, if the broad-match quality is good, this cost will generally be minimal.
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AdBM AcBM
Information asymmetry No Yes
(advertisers know all info on new edges) (advertisers don’t know info on new edges)
Extent of auctioneer’s control on the budget splitting No Control Limited Control
(only for the excess budgets)
An advertiser’s starting time for a keyword Very First Query Any Query
(only for the part auctioneer controls)
Table 1: Two Broad-Match Scenarios
the bid values for individual queries. In AcBM scenario, the auctioneer does have some control over
budget splitting. At one extreme, an advertiser might give the complete control to the auctioneer for
splitting her budget across various keywords letting the auctioneer decide how much should be spent
on which keyword. In this case, since the control will be completely in the hands of the auctioneer it
can perform the budget splitting so as to maximize his own total revenue without much concern to the
welfare of advertisers. Therefore, advertisers would hardly give such a full control to the auctioneer.
However, it is reasonable that an advertiser allows the auctioneer to spend her excess budget i.e. the
budget unspent in the case of G, in whatever way the auctioneer wants to spend it in G′ , in hope of an
additional payoff. Note that there must be some advertisers with excess budget for the AcBM to make
sense. If every advertiser is already spending its all budget then why to take all the pain of doing a
broad-match5 . In our study of AcBM in Section 6, we consider this limited control setting. Another
issue the auctioneer faces in AcBM is that what bid profiles to use along the edges in E′ \ E. The
auctioneer must perform these calculations in a manner to maintain equilibrium across the keywords
meaning that the advertisers should not be indirectly compelled to revise their true values along the
edges in G4. This assumption is reasonable as at SNE the auctioneer can estimate the true values from
the equilibrium bids on G and then along with the new information gathered for E′ \ E, can do the
proper SNE bids calculations on the behalf of the advertisers.
• An advertiser’s starting time for a keyword: In AdBM scenario, an advertisers participates in all
keywords she is interested in starting with its first query until her budget allocated for that keyword is
spent or there are no more queries for that keyword6. In AcBM scenario, however, since the auctioneer
is controlling at least a part of the budget splitting, and unlike advertisers, since it can easily track what
happens at which query in an online manner, it can choose to bring in an advertiser’s budget along an
edge starting with any particular query of that keyword. For example, it can bring advertiser i in the
auction of keyword j starting at say 1000th query of j.
Now, let us illustrate the above two scenarios via an example by considering the BMG given in Figure 1
(i.e. the graph without the edge (3, 1)) and its extension given in the same figure (i.e. the graph including the
edge (3, 1)). Further, each query is sold via a GSP auction (ref. Section 2), and the revenues are calculated
at SNE (ref. Equations 2, 3 in Section 2). In the base BMG, under GSP the advertiser 2 pays zero amount
for each query since there is no bidder ranked below her, therefore even with a very small budget she is
able to participate in all the queries of keyword 1. Thus, the total revenue extracted in the base BMG is
5In case, doing a broad-match encourages advertisers to increase their budgets, for the purpose of analysis, this increase can be
considered as an excess budget.
6In reality, Google/Yahoo! roughly allows the advertisers to specify which part of the day they want to spend most of their
budgets, nevertheless this option does not give a finer control such as specifying a particular query number they can start with.
Therefore, to simplify the incentive analysis we do not consider such option in this paper. Further, note that if the advertisers are
given a chance to express their desire as to which part of the day they want to spend how much budget, and as long as the day
is divided in to few parts (say polynomially many in the size of the BMG), then this expressiveness can be easily captured in the
present framework by replicating the role of relevant keyword nodes and dividing the total volume of queries for that keyword node
among these new nodes according to the size of the various parts of the day.
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0.9V1 + 0.6V2, 0.9V1 from keyword 1 and 0.6V2 from the keyword 2. Now in the extension, there is a
new edge (3, 1). In the AdBM scenario, since the advertiser 3 has the control of splitting the budget and
whether she wants to participate for keyword 1, she participates along (3, 1) for all queries as she never
needs to pay anything but certainly gets the second slot and positive payoffs for all the queries after the
advertiser 2 spends its all budget and drops out i.e. for all the queries after the first ǫV1th query. Note that
advertiser 2 now pays a positive amount for each query and is forced to drop as its total budget gets spent.
Therefore, the new revenue of the auctioneer is 0.9V1 + 3.1V1
(
ǫ− 0.33.1
)
+ 0.6V2 which is smaller than the
revenue generated in the base BMG if ǫ < 0.33.1 . However, in the AcBM scenario, the control is in the hands of
auctioneer and he can choose not to spend the (excess) budget of advertiser 3 along (3, 1), thereby avoiding
a potential revenue loss. Moreover, he has a finer control and can choose to bring 3 along (3, 1) after some
queries for 1 has already arrived. In particular, if he brings 3 along (3, 1) starting (1− ǫ)V1 +1th query, the
new revenue generated is (1− ǫ)0.9V1+2.3ǫV1+1.4ǫV1+0.6V2 which is more than the revenue generated
in the base BMG.
s4,2
= 2
4
B4
2
V2
s
3,2 = 4
3
B3 = 0.6V2 + 4
s2,1
= 3
2
B2 = 1.4ǫV1
1
V1
s
1,1 = 5
1
B1 = 0.9V1 + 1.4ǫV1
Advertisers Keywords
s3,1
= 2
Figure 1: A BMG (without the edge (3,1) ) and an extension (with the edge (3,1)), K = 2, γ1 = 1, γ2 = 0.7
5 Advertisers Controlled Broad Match (AdBM)
In this section, we start out with our first goal, that is to provide a reasonable solution concept for the game
originating from strategic behavior of advertisers as they try to optimize their budget allocation/splitting
across various keywords. We realize that without some reasonable restrictions on the set of available strate-
gies to the advertisers, it is a much harder task to achieve[2]. To this end, we consider a very natural setting
for available strategies- (i) first split/allocate the budget across various keywords and then (ii) play the key-
word query specific bidding/auction game as long as you have budget left over for that keyword when that
query arrives -thereby dividing the overall game in to two stages.
The second stage is exactly the query specific keyword auction and for that stage we can utilize the equi-
librium behavior proposed in literature. Therefore, in the second stage, we are restricting the behavior of
advertisers in that, given the availability of budget to participate in the auction of a particular query, an adver-
tiser acts rationally but being ignorant about and disregarding the fact that her bidding behavior might effect
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her decision in the splitting/allocation of her budget across various keywords in the first stage. For example,
in the second stage, for the auction mechanisms currently used by Google and Yahoo! i.e. Generalized
Second Price (GSP) Mechanism, we can adopt the solution concept of Symmetric Nash Equilibrium(SNE)
proposed in [5, 22]. That is, once the budget is split, for each query all advertisers, with available budgets
for the corresponding keyword, bid according to a minimum SNE bid profile. Note that, even for the same
keyword, different queries may have different SNE bid profiles because the set of advertisers with available
budgets may be different when those queries arrive.
Now, for the first stage i.e. budget splitting, we do not put any restriction on how the advertisers split
their budget across various keywords. Each advertiser, knowing the fact that all advertisers will behave
according to SNE for keyword queries, chooses her budget splitting so as to maximize her total payoff
across all queries of all keywords for the day. Thus, with the restriction on the bidding behavior in second
stage, we are left only to analyze the game of splitting the budget across various keywords.
In the spirit of [5, 22] wherein the query specific keyword auction is modeled as a static one shot game
of complete information despite its repeated nature in practice, we model the budget splitting too as a static
one shot game of complete information because if the budget splitting and bidding process ever stabilize,
advertisers will be playing static best responses to their competitors’ strategies. Let us refer to this game
as Broad-Match Game. In the following, we search for a reasonable notion of stable budget splitting i.e. a
reasonable solution concept for the Broad-Match Game.
5.1 Advertisers’ Best Response Problem and Search for an Appropriate Solution Concept
for Broad-Match Game
Let the budget of advertiser i decided for the keyword j be Bi,j , then this budget allows her to participate
for the first Vi,j number of queries for some Vi,j ≤ Vj . And given a number of queries Vi,j for j, there will
be a budget requirement from i, depending on the bidding interests of the other bidders, their valuations etc,
to participate in the first Vi,j queries of j. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the budget
spent on a particular keyword by a bidder and the total number of queries of that keyword starting the first
one, that the bidder participates in. Clearly, then the splitting of budget across various keywords can be
equivalently considered as deciding on how many queries to participate in, starting their first queries, for
those keywords.
Now, with the one shot complete information game modeling, the most natural solution concept to
consider is pure Nash equilibrium which in our scenario (i.e. for the Broad-Match Game correspond-
ing to the instance (N,M,K,S,B, V ) & BMG (N,M,E)) can be defined as the matrix of query values
{Vi,j , (i, j) ∈ E} such that for each i, given that these values are fixed for all l ∈ N − {i}, no other values
of {Vi,j} gives a better total payoff to the bidder i. Equivalently, it is the matrix of values {Bi,j , (i, j) ∈ E}
such that for each i, given that the these values are fixed for all l ∈ N− {i}, no other values of {Bi,j} gives
a better total payoff to the bidder i.
The solution concept of pure Nash equilibrium that we have proposed above requires that the players
(i.e. the advertisers) are powerful enough to play the game rationally. In particular, they should be able
to compute the best responses to their competitors’ strategies. In the present case, for an advertiser i, it
boils down to solving an optimization problem of finding the budget-splitting across various keywords with
maximum total payoff, given the budget- splitting of other advertisers. That is, given the values {Bn,j} for
all n ∈ N − {i} and for all j ∈ M, to compute {Bi,j} yielding maximum payoff for the advertiser i. Of
course, the details of BMG is known to every player. To justify this solution concept on algorithmic grounds,
it should be essential that this optimization problem of advertiser i, henceforth referred to as Advertisers’
Best Response Problem(AdBRP), should be solvable in time polynomial in N,M,K . Note that we are
strictly asking the time complexity to be polynomial in N,M,K and not in Vj’s and Bi’s. This is because
Vj’s and Bi’s could in general be exponentially larger than N,M,K . In fact, in practice this seem to be the
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case as volume of queries could be much larger than the number of advertisers and keywords. Therefore,
let us first formulate this optimization problem for advertiser i. Let c(m, j, l) be the (expected) cost of
advertiser m for the lth query of the keyword j if she participates in the query l and all the previous queries
of the keyword j. Similarly, u(m, j, l) is the (expected) payoff of advertiser m for the lth query of the
keyword j if she participates in the query l and all the previous queries of the keyword j. Also define the
marginal payoff or bang-per-buck for advertiser m for the lth query of keyword j as π(m, j, l) = u(m,j,l)
c(m,j,l) .
To be able to compute her best response, an advertiser must be able to efficiently compute these values
first. For each (i, j) ∈ E there are O(Vj) such values and at first glance it seems that the advertiser might
take a time polynomial in Vj , i.e. not in strongly polynomial time, to compute these values. However, if
we observe carefully there is a lot of redundancy in these values as noted in the following lemma. The
idea is that the cost and the payoff of an advertiser for a query of a keyword depends only on the set of
advertisers participating in that query and the valuations their of. Therefore, as long as this set is the same
these quantities will remain the same.
Lemma 1 For each i ∈ N, given the BMG G = (N,M,E) and the budget splitting of all advertisers in N−
{i} (i.e. the Bn,j values for all n ∈ N, j ∈ M), there exist non-negative integers Λj , zj,0, zj,1, zj,2, . . . , zj,Λj
for all j ∈ {j ∈M : (i, j) ∈ E} such that Λj = O(N) and for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λj − 1,
c(i, j, l) = C(i, j, λ), u(i, j, l) = U(i, j, λ), π(i, j, l) = Π(i, j, λ) ∀zj,λ < l ≤ zj,λ+1,
where C(i, j, λ) := c(i, j, zj,λ + 1), U(i, j, λ) := u(i, j, zj,λ + 1),Π(i, j, λ) := π(i, j, zj,λ + 1). Moreover,
all these Λ, z, c, u, π values can be computed together in O(MN2K) time.
Proof: The proof follows from Algorithm 5.1 described in the following. The idea in the Algorithm
5.1 is that the cost and the payoff of an advertiser for a query of a keyword depends only on the set of
advertisers participating in that query and the valuations their of. Therefore, as long as this set is the same
these quantities will remain the same. Further, there can be at most N choices of this set. For the very first
query, this set consists of all the advertisers with positive budget for that keyword along with the advertiser i
(recall that the budget splittings for other advertisers are given). This set changes when advertisers drop out
as their budgets get spent and they no longer have enough amount to buy the next query. This change can
occur at most N − 1 times. The Algorithm 5.1 tracks exactly when the advertisers drop out and compute
the c, u, π values accordingly.
The Algorithm 5.1 runs in time O(N2K). Initialization requires O(N) and the while loop requires
O(NK) in each iteration. There are at most O(N) iteration of the while loop because for every two itera-
tion at least one advertiser drops out. There is a NlogN term, subsumed by N2, that comes from the need
to sort the valuation si,j’s before computing the SNE bid profile.
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Algorithm 5.1: QUERY PARTITION(G, j,Bn,j∀n ∈ N − {i})
A← {n ∈ N − {i} : Bn,j > 0}
λ← 0
zj,0 ← 0
while A 6= φ
do


Compute C(n, j, λ) ∀n ∈ A ∪ {i}
and U(i, j, λ)
Π(i, j, λ) ← U(i,j,λ)
C(i,j,λ)
if C(i, j, λ) = 0
then Π(i, j, λ) ←∞
y ← minn∈A{⌊
Bn,j
C(n,j,λ)⌋}
if y > 0
then


A1 ← A− {n ∈ A :
Bn,j
C(n,j,λ) = y}
Bn,j ← Bn,j − yC(n, j, λ) ∀n ∈ A
zj,λ+1 ← min{zj,λ + y, Vj}
A← A1
λ← λ+ 1
if zj,λ = Vj
then exit
comment: Exiting the while LOOP
else
A← {n ∈ A : ⌊
Bn,j
C(n,j,λ)⌋ 6= 0}
if A = φ
then


C(i, j, λ) ← 0
U(i, j, λ) ← γ1si,j
Π(i, j, λ) ←∞
λ← λ+ 1
zj,λ ← Vj
Λj ← λ
output (Λj , {zj,λ}, {C(i, j, λ)}, {U(i, j, λ)}, {Π(i, j, λ)})
.
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Now, using the above lemma we are ready to formulate the AdBRP of advertiser i. Let us define,
U˜(i, j, l) = (l − zj,λ−1)U(i, j, λ− 1) +
λ−1∑
m=1
(zj,m − zj,m−1)U(i, j,m− 1) if zj,λ−1 < l ≤ zj,λ. (4)
C˜(i, j, l) = (l − zj,λ−1)C(i, j, λ − 1) +
λ−1∑
m=1
(zj,m − zj,m−1)C(i, j,m− 1) if zj,λ−1 < l ≤ zj,λ. (5)
then the AdBRP is the following optimization problem in non-negative integer variables xi,j’s.
Max
∑
(i,j)∈E
U˜(i, j, xi,j)
s.t.
∑
(i,j)∈E
C˜(i, j, xi,j) ≤ Bi (6)
0 ≤ xi,j ≤ Vj ∀ (i, j) ∈ E
xi,j ∈ Z ∀ (i, j) ∈ E
It is not hard to see that being a variant of Knapsack Problem (decision version of) AdBRP is NP-hard.
Its NP hardness follows from simple restrictions that makes it equivalent to 0-1 Knapsack Problem or Inte-
ger Knapsack Problem(IKP) respectively. First, let us restrict all relevant quantities such as budget, utilities
and costs to be integer values. Now, in AdBRP, choosing Vj = 1 for all j ∈ M makes it equivalent to the
0-1 Knapsack Problem. Also, in AdBRP, choosing Λj = 1 for all j ∈ M (i.e. a single partition for each
keyword) makes it equivalent to the Integer Knapsack Problem.
Now being NP-hard, AdBRP is unlikely to have an efficient algorithm and thus the solution concept
based on pure Nash equilibrium does not seem to be reasonable and we should consider weaker notions. One
such reasonable solution concept could be that based on local Nash equilibrium, where the advertisers are
not required to be so sophisticated and can deviate only locally i.e. by small amounts from the their current
strategies. We show that an advertiser’s locally best response can be computed via a greedy algorithm
in strongly polynomial time. Further, this equilibrium notion is similar to the user equilibrium/Waldrop
equilibrium in routing and transportation science literature[17]. Another solution concept that we explore
is motivated by the fact that being a variant of IKP and given that IKP can be approximated well, it may be
possible to efficiently compute a pretty good approximation of the advertiser’s best response, and therefore
an approximate Nash equilibrium may also make sense. In the following sub-sections we investigate these
two solution concepts.
5.2 Broad Match Equilibrium(BME)
Based on our discussion in section 5.1, let us first formally define the equilibrium notion based on local
Nash equilibrium and let us refer to it as Broad Match Equilibrium(BME).
Definition 2 Given a BMG G = (N,M,E), a BME for G is defined as the matrix of query values {Vi,j}
and the budget splitting values {Bi,j} iff they satisfy the following conditions.
E1) For all i, if (i, j) ∈ E with Vi,j > 0, and (i, l) ∈ E which is not query-saturated meaning Vi,j < Vj
then MP−i,j :=
u(i,j,Vi,j)
c(i,j,Vi,j)
≥ MP+i,l :=
u(i,l,Vi,l+1)
c(i,l,Vi,l+1)
i.e. the advertiser i does not have an incentive to
deviate locally from keyword j to keyword l.
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E2) For all i, i spends her total budget Bi (on some keyword or the other) unless each (i, j) ∈ E is either
query-saturated (i.e. Vi,j = Vj) or budget-saturated meaning that the left over budget of advertiser i
for keyword j is insufficient to buy the next query of j.
Now given the {Vn,j} and {Bn,j} values for all n ∈ N − {i}, the locally best response problem ( local
AdBRP) for i is to compute a set of {Vi,j} and {Bi,j} values such that they satisfy all conditions in the above
definition of BME. We show in the following theorem that the local AdBRP can be computed efficiently.
Thus, BME is indeed a reasonable solution concept for the Broad-Match Game.
The idea in the proof of Theorem 3 is to first partition the queries across various keywords via Lemma
1 so that the payoff, cost, and marginal payoff of i is the same for all queries in a given partition. Then, in a
GREEDY ALLOCATION PHASE, to greedily distribute the budgets across various keywords moving from
one partition to another. Finally, in a GREEDY READJUSTMENT PHASE, if there is an edge (i, l) which is
not stable (i.e. the advertiser i could profitably deviate locally to this edge from another edge(s)), a reverse
greedy approach would take budgets from edge with minimum marginal payoff and put it to (i, l) until
(i, l) becomes stable, again via moving from partition to partition. Since we always move from partition to
partition and a partition is visited at most once in each of the above two phases, and there are at most O(N)
partitions per keyword, this algorithm is efficient.
Theorem 3 There is a strongly polynomial time algorithm for local AdBRP.
Proof: The proof follows from the Algorithm 5.2 provided in the following. The Algorithm 5.2 first parti-
tions the queries across various keywords so that the payoff, cost, and marginal payoff of i is the same for
all queries in a given partition. This is computed via Algorithm 5.1 which takes O(MN2K) time. Initial-
ization takes O(M) time. In the GREEDY ALLOCATION PHASE, the algorithm greedily distributes the
budgets across various keywords moving from one partition to another. Each iteration of the while loop
in this phase takes O(M) time and since there are O(MN) partitions the total time taken for this loop is
O(M2N). GREEDY READJUSTMENT PHASE first checks if there is any edge (i, l) which is not stable i.e.
the advertiser i could profitably deviate locally to this edge from another edge(s). It is not hard to see that at
the end of GREEDY ALLOCATION PHASE, there can be at most one such edge (ref. Lemma 4). If there is
such an edge, this phase adjusts the budget to make this edge stable without making any other edge unstable.
This is achieved via a reverse greedy approach taking budgets from edge with minimum marginal payoff and
putting to (i, l) until (i, l) becomes stable, again via moving from partition to partition. Thus, Algorithm 5.2
correctly computes a locally best response for advertiser i. The while loop in this readjustment phase also
terminates in O(MN) iterations and therefore this phase takes total of O(M2N) time. Hence, the running
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time of Algorithm 5.2 is O(MN2K +M2N) i.e. strongly polynomial time.
Algorithm 5.2: GREEDY BUDGET SPLITTING(G,Bn,j∀n ∈ N− {i}, j ∈ M)
Ji = {j ∈ M : (i, j) ∈ E}
comment: Computing Λ, z, C, U,Π values for all relevant j’s
for each j ∈ Ji
do QUERY PARTITION(G, j,Bn,j∀n ∈ N − {i})
comment: Initialization
λj ← 0 ∀j ∈ Ji
yj ← zj,1 ∀j ∈ Ji
Ci,j ← 0, Bi,j ← 0, Vi,j ← 0 ∀j ∈ Ji
Ci ← 0
comment: GREEDY ALLOCATION PHASE
while Ji 6= φ
do


L← argmaxj∈Ji Π(i, j, λj)
if there are more than one such index take the minimum one
if Ci + yLC(i, L, λL) > Bi
then


y ← ⌊ Bi−Ci
C(i,L,λL)
⌋
Vi,L ← Vi,L + y
Bi,L ← Bi,L + (Bi − Ci)
Ci,L ← Ci,L + yC(i, L, λL)
Ci ← Ci + yC(i, L, λL)
exit
comment: Exiting the while LOOP
else


Bi,L ← Bi,L + yLC(i, L, λL)
Ci,L ← Ci,L + yLC(i, L, λL)
Ci ← Ci + yLC(i, L, λL)
Vi,L ← Vi,L + yL
if λL = Λj − 1
comment: i.e. no more queries for L is left
then
{
Ji ← Ji − {L}
λL ← λL + 1
else
{
yL ← zL,λL+1 − zL,λL
λL ← λL + 1
comment: GREEDY READJUSTMENT PHASE
Ji ← {j : (i, j) ∈ E and Vi,j > 0}
l← {l ∈ M : (i, l) ∈ E and ∃j ∈ Ji − {l} s.t. MP+i,l > MP
−
i,j}
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comment: there can be at most one such l (ref. Lemma 4)
if such an l does not exist
then return ({Vi,j}, {Bi,j})
comment: Readjustment not required
while λl < Λl and MP+i,l > minj∈Ji−{l}MP
−
i,j
do


j ← argminj∈Ji−{l}MP
−
i,j
y ←
⌊
(Vi,j−zj,λj−1)C(i,j,λj−1)+(Bi,j−Ci,j)+(Bi,l−Ci,l)
C(i,l,λl)
⌋
if y < zl,λl+1 − Vi,l
then


Bi,l ← Bi,l + (Vi,j − zj,λj−1)C(i, j, λj − 1)
+(Bi,j − Ci,j)
Ci,j ← Ci,j − (Vi,j − zj,λj−1)C(i, j, λj − 1)
Bi,j ← Ci,j
Ci,l ← Ci,l + yC(i, l, λl)
λj ← λj − 1
Vi,j ← zj,λj
if Vi,j = 0
then Ji ← Ji − {j}
Vi,l ← Vi,l + y
else


y˜ ←
⌈
(zl,λl+1−Vi,l)C(i,l,λl)−(Bi,j−Ci,j)−(Bi,l−Ci,l)
C(i,j,λj−1)
⌉
Ci,j ← Ci,j − y˜C(i, j, λj − 1)
Bi,j ← Bi,j + [(zl,λl+1 − Vi,l)C(i, l, λl)− (Bi,l − Ci,l)]
Ci,l ← Ci,l + (zl,λl+1 − Vi,l)C(i, l, λl)
Bi,l ← Ci,l
if y˜ = Vi,j − zj,λj−1
then


λj ← λj − 1
Vi,j ← zj,λj
if Vi,j = 0
then Ji ← Ji − {j}
else Vi,j ← Vi,j − y˜
λl ← λl + 1
Vi,l ← zl,λl
output ({Vi,j}, {Bi,j})
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.Lemma 4 At the end of GREEDY ALLOCATION PHASE of Algorithm 5.2, there can be at most one
unstable edge, that is
|
{
l ∈ M : (i, l) ∈ E and ∃j s.t.(i, j) ∈ E, Vi,j > 0 &MP+i,l > MP
−
i,j
}
| < 1.
Proof: We will provide a proof by contradiction. If possible, let there be two unstable edges namely (i, l)
and (i,m), thus there exist an edge (i, j) ∈ E with Vi,j > 0 such that MP+i,l > MP
−
i,j and MP
+
i,m > MP
−
i,j .
Note that there could be many such choices of j, let us choose the one with the minimum value of MP−i,j .
Thus, in the Figure 2, we are given that π1 < min {π3, π5}. Since the greedy allocation phase fills up ( or
selects) the partitions with higher values first, starting the markers on the first partition of all the keywords,
there must be partitions with values π2 ≤ π1 and π4 ≤ π1 as shown in Figure 2, otherwise all partitions
of (i, l) before and with the value π3 must have been filled/selected before the partition with value π1 and
similarly for all partitions of (i,m) before and with the value π5. WLog let the partition with the value π2 is
filled before that with π4. Therefore, π3 ≤ π4 otherwise the open partition ( i.e. the one not yet completely
filled ) with value π3 would have been filled before π4. Further, by using π2 ≤ π1 and π1 < π3 we get
π2 < π3 and consequently π2 < π4. As before we can again argue that there exist a partition with value
π6 < π2 but we must also have π3 ≤ π6 otherwise the open partition with value π3 would have been filled
before π6. But this implies π3 < π2 which is a contradiction. .
. . .
MP−i,j = π1 < min {π3, π5}
. . . . . .
. . .
π2 π3
. . . . . .
MP+i,l = π3 > π2
. . .
π4 π5
. . . . . .
MP+i,m = π5 > π4
Figure 2: There can not be two unstable edges at the end of GREEDY ALLOCATION PHASE in Algorithm
5.2. The π values shown in the figure are the marginal payoffs of i in the respective partitions. “. . . ” shown
between two partitions indicate that there could be several or no partitions between these partitions.
One might also like to consider another natural strongly polynomial time greedy algorithm based on
the algorithm for fractional knapsack problem, considering each keyword as an item, total payoff (from all
the queries that can be bought within the budget constraint) as the value and the corresponding total cost
as the size, sorting the keywords by effective marginal payoffs i.e. total payofftotal cost , and greedily selecting the
keywords until budget is exhausted. However, it can be shown (Figure 4) that this greedy approach does not
always lead to a locally best response of an advertiser i.e. there are examples where the solution given by
this algorithm is not stable and the advertiser can improve her payoff by local deviation. Further, it is not
clear whether some readjustment procedure as in the GREEDY READJUSTMENT PHASE of the Algorithm
16
5.2 could be applied to make such solutions stable. In this paper, we have not explored this direction in
details and it might be interesting to make this algorithm work, if possible, by some suitable readjustment,
and compare its performance with to that of Algorithm 5.2. For an initial insight, first note that, in the
example given in Figure 3, the marginal payoffs for a keyword are increasing with the partition number i.e.
Π(i, 2, 1) > Π(i, 2, 0). The effective marginal payoff for keyword 2 is 4.5V1−7.52V1−2 > 2 when V1 > 7 and
this algorithms therefore spends all budget on keyword 2, giving a payoff better than Algorithm 5.2. Also,
it is a stable solution because MP−i,2 = 3 > 2 = MP
+
i,1. In fact, in this particular example it is the global
optimum. In general, clearly when this algorithm returns a stable solution without a need for readjustment,
it always chooses a better budget splitting than Algorithm 5.2, however as we give an example below in the
Figure 4, it might not always return a stable solution.
z1,0 = 0 z1,1 = V1
U(i, 1, 0) = 4
C(i, 1, 0) = 2
Π(i, 1, 0) = 2
z2,0 = 0 z2,1 = V1 + 1
U(i, 2, 0) = 1.5
C(i, 2, 0) = 1
Π(i, 2, 0) = 1.5
z2,2 = V2
U(i, 2, 1) = 3
C(i, 2, 1) = 1
Π(i, 2, 1) = 3
Figure 3: Let Bi = 2(V1 − 1) and V2 ≥ 2V1 − 2. Algorithm 5.2 outputs (Bi,1 = Bi, Bi,2 = 0, Vi,1 =
V1 − 1, Vi,2 = 0) with total payoff of 4V1 − 4 to the advertiser. However, the splitting (Bi,1 = 0, Bi,2 =
Bi, Vi,1 = 0, Vi,2 = 2V1 − 2) gives a total payoff of 4.5V1 − 7.5 > 4V1 − 4 when V1 > 7.
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0 20
U(i, 1, 0) = 3.36
C(i, 1, 0) = 0.8
Π(i, 1, 0) = 4.2
0 10
U(i, 2, 0) = 2
C(i, 2, 0) = 0.4
Π(i, 2, 0) = 5
30
U(i, 2, 1) = 3.2
C(i, 2, 1) = 0.8
Π(i, 2, 1) = 4
Figure 4: Greedy fractional knapsack algorithm may not return a stable solution. Bi = 12. This algorithm
allocates all the budget to the keyword 2 as the effective marginal payoffs is 2×10+3.2×100.4×10+0.8×10 =
52
12 which
is greater than that of keyword 1 which is 3.36×150.8×15 =
50.4
12 . However, the edge (i, 1) is now unstable as
MP+i,1 = 4.2 > 4 = MP
−
i,2.
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5.3 Approximate Nash Equilibrium(ǫ-NE)
Let us first define the approximate Nash equilibrium for our setting as follows.
Definition 5 Given a BMG G = (N,M,E), an ǫ-NE for G is defined as the matrix of query values {Vi,j}
and the budget splitting values {Bi,j} such that for all i,
∑
(i,j)∈E U˜(i, j, Vi,j) ≥ (1−ǫ)
∑
(i,j)∈E U˜(i, j, V˜i,j)
for all alternative strategy choices {V˜i,j} of advertiser i that satisfies the constraints in Equation 6.
Now given the {Vn,j} and {Bn,j} values for all n ∈ N − {i}, the approximate best response problem (
ǫ-AdBRP) for i is to compute a set of {Vi,j} and {Bi,j} values satisfying the conditions in the above defini-
tion of ǫ-NE.
As we mentioned earlier, the AdBRP is a variant of knapsack problem and we also know that the later
can be approximated very well. Further, if we expect to get an FPTAS for AdBRP, we would expect that
it also admits a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm (i.e. polynomial in N , M , K , Vj’s, and Bi’s) as well
[23, 16]. Furthermore, all known pseudo-polynomial time algorithms for NP-hard problems are based on
dynamic programming [23, 16]. Therefore, naturally we try a similar approach. Perhaps not surprisingly,
we design a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for AdBRP. However, unlike the case of standard knapsack
problems[8, 10, 23, 16], this algorithm does not immediately give a FPTAS due to difficulty in handling
the volume of queries and because for a given keyword (i.e. the item) queries may have different costs
and utilities (i.e. all units of an item are not equivalent in cost and value) etc. Nevertheless, by judiciously
utilizing the properties of the optimum and a double-layered approximation we will indeed present a FPTAS
for AdBRP (Theorem 6). We will devote the Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3 on developing a FPTAS for AdBRP.
Theorem 6 There is a FPTAS for AdBRP.
Thus, ǫ-NE is indeed another reasonable solution concept for the Broad-Match Game.
5.3.1 A Pseudo Polynomial Time Algorithm for AdBRP
Without loss of generality, first let us assume that all relevant parameters such as budget, utilities, and costs
are integer valued. This can be achieved by suitable approximation to rational numbers and then by appro-
priate multiplication factors, without significant increase in instance size.
Let P be the maximum total utility that the advertiser i can derive from a single keyword i.e. from
any one of the j ∈ M while respecting her budget constraint. Therefore, MP is a trivial upperbound on
the total utility that can be achieved by any solution (i.e. any choice of feasible xi,l’s). For j ∈ M and
p = 1, 2, . . . ,MP let us define,
A(j, p) =


Min
∑j
l=1 C˜(i, l, xi,l)
s.t.
∑j
l=1 U˜(i, l, xi,l) ≥ p
0 ≤ xi,l ≤ Vl for l = 1, 2, . . . , j
xi,l ∈ Z for l = 1, 2, . . . , j
∞ if no solution to the above minimization problem exists
(7)
Clearly, the values A(1, p) for all p = 1, 2, . . . ,MP can each be efficiently computed ( in O(Nlog(V1))
time) by utilizing the partition structure as per Lemma 1 and the Equations 4 and 5. The term log(V1)
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instead of V1 comes from the the fact that it is enough to perform a binary search inside a partition for
an appropriate xi,1. Therefore, the values A(1, p) for all p = 1, 2, . . . ,MP can be together computed in
O(Nlog(V1)MP ) time. Let V =
∑
j∈MVj . Now, A(j, p) for all j = 2, 3, . . . ,M and p = 1, 2, . . . ,MP
can be computed together in O(M2PNV ) using following recurrence relation. Further, for each choice of
j = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,M and p = 1, 2, . . . ,MP , we also compute and store the set of xi,j’s values that achieves
the value of A(j, p), and this task can be performed in same order of time complexity.
A(j + 1, p) =


Min
∑j
l=1 C˜(i, l, xi,l) + C˜(i, j + 1, xi,j+1)
s.t.
∑j
l=1 U˜(i, l, xi,l) + U˜(i, j + 1, xi,j+1) ≥ p
0 ≤ xi,l ≤ Vl for l = 1, 2, . . . , j + 1
xi,l ∈ Z for l = 1, 2, . . . , j + 1
∞ if no solution to the above minimization problem exists
= min
xi,j+1∈{0,1,2,...,Vj+1}:U˜(i,j+1,xi,j+1)≤p
{
C˜(i, j + 1, xi,j+1) +A(j, p − U˜(i, j + 1, xi,j+1))
}
(8)
After computing the A(j, p)’s, we can obtain the solution of AdBRP and the optimum value via
OPT = max
p=1,2,...,MP
{p : A(M,p) ≤ Bi} . (9)
Thus, we have a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for AdBRP.
5.3.2 A Pseudo Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for AdBRP
Now, we will convert the pseudo polytime algorithm of Section 5.3.1 to an approximation scheme by appro-
priately rounding the payoffs of the advertisers. Let us call this scheme AS1.
For a given ǫ > 0, let T = ǫP
M
and let us round the utility functions from U˜(i, l, xi,l) to U˜
′
(i, l, xi,l) =
⌊
U˜(i,l,xi,l)
T
⌋. Now, let us use the above dynamic programming algorithm by replacing the upper bound on
utility P to ⌊P
T
⌋ and utilities U˜(i, l, xi,l) to U˜
′
(i, l, xi,l). Let us denote the solution returned as V
′
i,j i.e. the
optimum of the problem after above rounding is attained at xi,j = V
′
i,j, j ∈ M. Correspondingly, let the
optimal solution without any rounding is Vi,j, j ∈ M. Note that the values {Vi,j} are still feasible for the
rounded problem.
Now since {V ′i,j} is optimal for the rounded problem we have∑
j∈M
U˜
′
(i, j, V
′
i,j) ≥
∑
j∈M
U˜
′
(i, j, Vi,j)
≥
∑
j∈M
(
U˜(i, j, Vi,j)
T
− 1
)
=
∑
j∈M
U˜(i, j, Vi,j)
T
−M (10)
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Further, using the inequality 10, we can get∑
j∈M
U˜(i, j, V
′
i,j) ≥
∑
j∈M
T U˜
′
(i, j, V
′
i,j)
≥
∑
j∈M
U˜(i, j, Vi,j)− TM
=
∑
j∈M
U˜(i, j, Vi,j)− ǫP
≥ (1− ǫ)
∑
j∈M
U˜(i, j, Vi,j)
where the last inequality is implied by the fact that the optimal value without rounding will at least be the
maximum derived from a single keyword i.e.
∑
j∈M U˜(i, j, Vi,j) ≥ P . Therefore, the {V
′
i,j} gives an
(1− ǫ) approximation to the advertiser i’s best response. The time complexity of the dynamic programming
applied to obtain the solution {V ′i,j} is O(M2⌊PT ⌋NV ) = O(M
2N(⌊M
ǫ
⌋)V ) which is polynomial in N ,
M , V and 1
ǫ
. Note that this scheme is still pseudo polynomial due to appearance of V . This terms appears
because when we build up the dynamic programming table we need to use the Equation 8. Nevertheless,
this algorithm will be helpful in designing our FPTAS.
5.3.3 FPTAS for AdBRP
Now using the approximation scheme AS1 and by judiciously truncating set of possible query values we
will present an FPTAS for AdBRP. Let us first note that for each keyword only the number of queries,
starting the first one, that can be bought under budget constraint Bi are feasible. Therefore, for the ease of
notation, without loss of generality, we can assume that Vj is infact the maximum number of queries that
can be bought under budget constraint meaning all possible queries of a particular keyword are feasible if i
wanted to spend her total budget on this keyword. Let V =
∑
j∈M Vj . Also, without loss of generality we
have U(i, j, λ) > 0 for all λ and j such that (i, j) ∈ E.
Now, we perform a first layer of approximation by judiciously truncating the set of possible query values
to obtain Lemma 8. Lemma 7 is just a warmup.
Lemma 7 There is a feasible solution {Vˆi,j} of AdBRP with the total utility ˆOPT satisfying the following
properties where OPT is the total utility for the optimal solution of AdBRP:
• At most for one j ∈M , Vˆi,j /∈ {zj,0, zj,1, zj,2, . . . , zj,Λj}
• ˆOPT ≥ (1− δ)OPT where δ = maxj,λ U(i,j,λ)OPT .
Proof:
Consider all the keywords j for which Vi,j /∈ {zj,0, zj,1, zj,2, . . . , zj,Λj}. Now among these keywords,
for the keywords with the maximum value of π(i, j, Vi,j), move the budget from one to the other un-
less all keywords of such type except one satisfies the above condition, this moving around of budgets
among the keywords with the same value of π(i, j, Vi,j) does not change the total utility. Thus, we can
safely assume that there is a single keyword satisfying Vi,j /∈ {zj,0, zj,1, zj,2, . . . , zj,Λj} with the maxi-
mum value of π(i, j, Vi,j) and say its l. Further, we can move budget from all other keywords satisfying
Vi,j /∈ {zj,0, zj,1, zj,2, . . . , zj,Λj} to l until they satisfy Vi,j ∈ {zj,0, zj,1, zj,2, . . . , zj,Λj}, while losing at
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most u(i, l, Vi,l). This is because while doing this reallocation we lose only when we do not have enough
budget to move to buy the next query of l. .
Lemma 8 For every given parameter ǫ < 1, there is a feasible solution {Vˆi,j} of AdBRP with the total
utility ˆOPT satisfying the following properties where OPT is the total utility for the optimal solution of
AdBRP:
• ˆOPT ≥ (1− ǫ2)OPT
• Vˆi,j ∈ {yj,0, yj,1, yj,2, . . . , yj,nj} for all j ∈M where the yj,. values are defined as follows:
for each partition λ = 1, 2, . . . ,Λj of the keyword j let zj,λ − zj,λ−1 = a⌈Mǫ2 ⌉ + b where a and
b are non-negative integers and b < ⌈M
ǫ2
⌉ (recall that zj,λ − zj,λ−1 is the size of partition λ). Now
divide the partition λ in to min{a, 1}.⌈M
ǫ2
⌉+b sub-partitions, the first min{a, 1}.⌈M
ǫ2
⌉ sub-partitions
being of size a queries each and the next b partitions each of size 1 query each. Define yj,0 = 0 and
yj,1, yj,2, . . . , yj,nj as the end points of the sub-partitions created as above.
Proof: Clearly, each partition is divided in to at most 2⌈M
ǫ2
⌉ sub-partitions and since Λj = O(N) we obtain
nj = O(
NM
ǫ2
).
Let {Vi,j} be an optimal solution for AdBRP, then we find a solution {Vˆi,j} as follows:
• if Vi,j ∈ {yj,0, yj,1, yj,2, . . . , yj,nj} then Vˆi,j = Vi,j , therefore we do not lose anything in total utility
coming from keyword j by moving from Vi,j to Vˆi,j .
• if Vi,j /∈ {yj,0, yj,1, yj,2, . . . , yj,nj} then define Vˆi,j to be the maximum value among {yj,0, yj,1, yj,2, . . . , yj,nj}
which is smaller than Vi,j . Note that this case arises only when Vi,j comes from a sub-partition of
size a > 1 and in that case there are at least ⌈M
ǫ2
⌉ sub-partitions of size a with the same utility value
u(i, j, Vi,j) for each query in those sub-partitions. The maximum utility that we can lose by truncating
Vi,j to Vˆi,j is ≤ a u(i, j, Vi,j) ≤ 1⌈M
ǫ2
⌉
(
⌈M
ǫ2
⌉ a u(i, j, Vi,j)
)
≤ 1
⌈M
ǫ2
⌉
OPT ≤ ǫ
2
M
OPT .
Note that the way we have constructed {Vˆi,j}, it satisfies the budget constraint of the advertiser i
because Vˆi,j ≤ Vi,j and hence {Vˆi,j} is a feasible solution of AdBRP. Now, across all the keywords
we can lose at most M ǫ2
M
OPT i.e. ǫ2OPT by truncating the optimal solution {Vi,j} to the feasible
solution {Vˆi,j}. .
Now we perform a second layer of approximation by applying AS1 with truncated set of possible query
values as per Lemma 8. We present this approximation algorithm called AS2 in the following.
1. Divide each partition of each keyword in to several sub-partitions as follows (same as in the proof of
Lemma 8). For each partition λ = 1, 2, . . . ,Λj of the keyword j let zj,λ−zj,λ−1 = a⌈Mǫ2 ⌉+b where a
and b are non-negative integers and b < ⌈M
ǫ2
⌉ (recall that zj,λ− zj,λ−1 is the size of partition λ). Now
divide the partition λ in to min{a, 1}.⌈M
ǫ2
⌉+ b sub-partitions, the first min{a, 1}.⌈M
ǫ2
⌉ sub-partitions
being of size a queries each and the next b partitions each of size 1 query each. Define yj,0 = 0 and
yj,1, yj,2, . . . , yj,nj as the end points of the sub-partitions created as above.
2. Apply AS1 by restricting the query values to take values only from the set {yj,0, yj,1, yj,2, . . . , yj,nj}
i.e. by changing the recurrence relation 8 to
A(j+1, p) = min
xi,j+1∈{yj,0,yj,1,yj,2,...,yj,nj }:U˜(i,j+1,xi,j+1)≤p
{
C˜(i, j + 1, xi,j+1) +A(j, p − U˜(i, j + 1, xi,j+1))
}
(11)
22
and with the error parameter ǫ˜, where 1
ǫ˜
= 1
ǫ
+ 1 ≤ 2
ǫ
.
The total utility of the solution returned by the algorithm AS2 is
≥ (1− ǫ˜)(1 − ǫ2)OPT = (1−
ǫ
1 + ǫ
)(1− ǫ2)OPT = (1− ǫ)OPT.
The time complexity in constructing the sub-partitions is O(NM
ǫ2
) and that of applying AS1 on the
truncated set of query values {yj,0, yj,1, yj,2, . . . , yj,nj} isO(M2N(⌊Mǫ˜ ⌋)
NM
ǫ2
) = O(M
4N2
ǫ3
) as 1
ǫ˜
= 1
ǫ
+1 ≤
2
ǫ
= O(1
ǫ
). Therefore, AS2 is indeed a FPTAS for AdBRP.
5.4 To Broad-match or not to Broad-match
In this section, we start out with a very important observation in the following theorem.
Theorem 9 A BMG does not necessarily have a unique BME and the different BMEs can yield different
revenues to the auctioneer. Moreover, in one of them the auctioneer loses while in the other one it gains in
terms of revenue.
The Theorem 9 leaves the auctioneer in a dilemma about whether he should broad-match or not. If he
could somehow predict which choice of broad match lead to a revenue improvement for him and which not,
he could potentially choose the ones leading to a revenue improvement. This brings forth one of the big
questions left open in this paper, that is of efficiently computing a BME / ǫ-NE, if one exists, given a choice
of broad match. We plan to explore it in our future works. The proof of the above theorem follows from
examples constructed in Figures 5, 6, 7. Further, in all the examples we take K = 2, γ1 = 1, γ2 = 0.7.
We also note several other observations such as
• introducing an edge may or may not shift the BME ( See Figures 8,9)
• introducing an edge can shift the BME to one yielding less revenue to the auctioneer , as well as, to
one with less efficiency i.e. social welfare ( See Figure 1, 9)
• introducing new edges can shift the BME to one yielding more revenue to the auctioneer (See Figures
9, 5, 6, 7)
• unlike in Figure 9, an extension of a BMG may not have a BME where for all nodes the degree is the
same as in the BME for the base BMG. See Figures 1, 6, 7.
It is instructive to note that all the above observations (including Theorem 9) continue to hold
under the solution concept of ǫ-NE.
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B3 = 2.25V2
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B2 = 0.6V3
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R0 = 0.9V1 + 0.45V2 + 0.6V3
Advertisers Keywords
E0 = 7.1V1 + 6.05V2 + 4.4V3
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2
4
Figure 5: A BMG (without dashed edges) and its extension (with dashed edges). The values shown along
the edges are si,j respectively. Further, note that it is a good broad-match as valuations si,j of an advertiser
along new edges is greater than her valuation along old edges.
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MP+2,1 = 0.5
MP−2,3 = 4.67
MP−5,2 = 1.67
MP+5,3 = 0.5
Figure 6: One BME for the extension of BMG in Figure 5 ( the values Vi,j at this BME are shown along
corresponding edges).
Not a pure Nash equilibrium but an ǫ-NE for ǫ ≥ 0.15.
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Figure 7: Another BME for the extension of BMG in Figure 5.
Also a pure Nash equilibrium, therefore an ǫ-NE for ǫ ≥ 0.
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Figure 8: No Shift in Equilibrium due to the new edge (3,1). The values shown along edge (i, j) is (si,j, Vi,j).
ui denote total payoff of advertiser i.
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Assume: V1 > V26
E = 6.749V2 < 7.583V2 for V1 = V26
Figure 9: A Shift in Equilibrium due to the new edge (3,1). The values shown along edge (i, j) is (si,j, Vi,j).
ui denote total payoff of advertiser i.
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6 Auctioneer Controlled Broad Match(AcBM)
In this section we study the second broad match scenario i.e. AcBM as described in section 4. First, we need
a few definitions.
Definition 10 Excess Budget: Let G = (N,M,E) be a BMG and G′ = (N,M,E′ ) be an extension (broad-
match) of G. For an i ∈ N, let Di denote the budget of i unspent in G and let si = maxj∈E si,j. We say that
i has an excess budget in G iff si ≤ Di.
Intuitively, what we mean by an advertiser to have an excess budget is that she has enough amount currently
left unspent so that she can participate in at least one query of any of the keywords she is currently bidding
on, if given a chance, irrespective of the valuations of her competitors.
Definition 11 Revenue Improving Broad-Match: An extension G′ = (N,M,E′ ) of BMG G = (N,M,E)
is called revenue improving if there exist an allocation of the excess budgets along new edges (i.e. edges in
E
′
\ E) so that the sum of total budget spent by all the advertisers is more in G′ than in G, as well as, there
is a strongly polynomial time algorithm to find such an allocation of the excess budgets.
Now, for a keyword j, let I(j, l) denote the set of advertisers having sufficient budget to participate in
the lth query of this keyword. The following lemma can be obtained in a way similar to the Lemma 1 and
again utilizing the partition structure per this lemma, we obtain Observation 13 that as long as the quality
of broad-match is good in some sense, the auctioneer can guarantee a better revenue for himself by suitably
exploiting the extension.
Lemma 12 Given the budget splitting of all the advertisers for the BMG G = (N,M,E) (i.e. the cur-
rent budget splitting ), that is the values Bi,j’s for all (i, j) ∈ E, there exist non-negative integers Λj ,
zj,0, zj,1, zj,2, . . . , zj,Λj , and sets Ij,1, Ij,2, . . . , Ij,Λj , Ij for all j ∈ M} such that Λj = O(N) and for
all 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λj − 1, c(i, j, l) = C(i, j, λ), I(j, l) = Ij,λ+1 ∀zj,λ < l ≤ zj,λ+1 where C(i, j, λ) :=
c(i, j, zj,λ + 1), Ij,λ+1 := I(j, zj,λ + 1) and Ij = {i ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E, i has an excess budget in G}.
Moreover, all these Λ, z, C, I values can be computed together in time polynomial in N , M and K .
Observation 13 Let G′ = (N,M,E′ ) be an extension of BMG G = (N,M,E), I = ∪j∈MIj , Ji ={
j ∈ M : (i, j) ∈ E
′
\ E
}
for i ∈ I , Γj =
{
i ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E
′
}
, and Φ =
{
j ∈ M : Ij,Λj = φ
}
. This
extension is revenue improving if there is an i ∈ I having one or more of the following properties/conditions:
a) ∃j ∈ Ji \ Φ such that Ij,Λj = Ij and |
{
m ∈ Ij,Λj : sm,j > si,j
}
| < K.
b) ∃j ∈ Ji ∩ Φ such that | {l ∈ I ∩ Γj : sl,j = si,j} ∪ {l ∈ Γj : sl,j < si,j} | > 1.
c) ∃j ∈ Ji \ Φ such that Ij,Λj 6= Ij and si,j > maxl∈Ij,Λj\Ij sl,j .
Intuitively, the properties a) and c) says that there is an advertiser i with excess budget in G and a keyword
j such that i has a good enough valuation for j in G′ so as to obtain a slot, and moreover if i is brought in
for the last query, all advertisers already participating in that query have still enough budget to participate
in that query. The condition b) says that there is a keyword j with unsold queries in G and we can sell
these queries in G′ to at least two advertisers13 . Thus, these conditions allow the auctioneer to bring addi-
tional advertiser(s) for the keyword j to j’s last query or equivalently the very first query in the last partition
13Note that just selling to one advertiser does not generate any money in GSP. In practice, however Google/Yahoo! charges a
minimum amount i.e. a reserve price for the last slot. Nevertheless, all the results we present remains unchanged by introducing
reserve prices for the last slot. In that case, the condition b) will change to ∃j ∈ Ji ∩ Φ.
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((zj,Λj−1 + 1)th query) so that revenue extracted from this particular query is improved without changing
the revenue generated from any other query. Therefore, in terms of the existence of a revenue improving
extension we have the above observation. Nevertheless, in general the auctioneer can do much more than
the above trivial way. In particular, there might be several i and j’s satisfying the properties in Observation
13 and he could exploit this profitably. Recall that he has a finer control over which query to start with
and whatever part of excess budget he can spend along edges in E′ \ E. So his task is to choose splitting
of excess budgets along new edges as well as to decide a starting query number. In general, there could
be O(N) advertisers with excess budgets and there could be O(MN) new edges, finding the best splitting
is a variant of Integer Knapsack problem again and thus computationally hard. Nevertheless, it is clearly
possible to design strongly polynomial time sub-optimal algorithm that does significantly better than the
trivial improvement possible by increasing competition for the last query. The problem with participating
starting a query in other partitions is that it may change the partition structure in a way that is not revenue
improving, but since there are only O(N) such partitions for each keyword, we could check for each parti-
tion whether starting with its first query is revenue improving or not. Indeed, it is easy to think of a strongly
polynomial time algorithm that finds excess budget splittings which improves revenue, one that moves from
partition to partition, taking starting query as the first query in that partition and then doing a binary search
for appropriate budget (as high as possible) to be allocated and tracks which one of these possibilities lead
to the highest revenue. Note that since we are doing a binary search on budget (and equivalently on the
number of queries to participate in), we are still in strongly polynomial time regime. Finally, it should be
interesting to search for efficient algorithms generating better revenue and in particular a FPTAS, possibly
by efficiently searching for which query to start with along with efficiently searching for how many queries
to participate for.
Now, given that auctioneer’s goal is primarily to improve revenue, we should also analyze what happens
to the efficiency (i.e. social welfare), if the auctioneer implements such revenue improving broad-match.
First, it is clear that if auctioneer’s goal were to improve social welfare instead of revenue, he could cer-
tainly do so in a way similar to the one discussed above for revenue improvement. Moreover, revenue and
social welfare could infact be improved together if one of the conditions in Observation 13 holds and the
proof is same as that for Observation 13 by bringing in appropriate advertiser(s) in the last query of an ap-
propriate keyword. However, if auctioneer deviates from this trivial way of improving revenue, which infact
he will do if his goal is to maximize revenue, there can often be a tradeoff with social welfare. For an explicit
example of this tradeoff please refer to Figure 10. Furthermore, even when the conditions in Observation 13
are NOT satisfied, there might still be a possibility of revenue improvement (ref. Figure 1).
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B4 = 20
2
V2 = 100
1.5
3
B3 = 40
3
2
B2 = 37
1
V1 = 100
5
1
B1 = 45
2
z1,0 = 0 z1,1 = 50
I1,1 = {1, 2}
R0 = 50× (0.3× 3) = 45
E0 = 50× (5 + 0.7× 3) + 50× 3 = 505
z1,2 = 100
I1,2 = {2}
a)
0 19
{1, 2, 3}
36
{2, 3}
100
{3}
Ra = 19× (0.3× 3 + 2× 1.4× 2) + 17× (0.3× 2) = 80.5 > R0
Ea = 19× (5 + 0.7× 3) + 17× (3 + 0.7× 2) + 64× 2 = 337.7 < E0
b)
0
{1, 2}
50 100
{2, 3}
Rb = 50× (0.3× 3) + 50× (0.3× 2) = 75 > R0
Eb = 50× (5 + 0.7× 3) + 50× (3 + 0.7× 2) = 575 > E0
R0 < Rb < Ra but Ea < E0 < Eb
c)
0
{1, 2} {1, 2, 3} {2, 3}
403 21 100
{3}
Rc = 3× (0.3× 3) + 18× (0.3× 3 + 2× 0.7× 2) + 19× (0.3× 2) = 80.7
Ec = 21× (5 + 0.7× 3) + 19× (3 + 0.7× 2) + 60× 2 = 352.7
Rc > Ra
Figure 10: Tradeoff in revenue and social welfare, the base BMG does not include edge (3, 1), its extension
does. The revenue and efficiency value is just for keyword 1, as these values do not change for keyword
2 even in the extension. In a) and b) advertiser 3 is brought in for keyword 1 starting with first query
in partition 1 and 2 respectively. Note that the choice of partition with better revenue is the one where
efficiency decreases. c) shows that just starting with the first query of a partition may not lead to optimal
revenue, for example if 3 is started with 4th query then the revenue improvement is even better than a) or
b).
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7 Future Directions
We have initiated a study of broad-match, an interesting aspect of sponsored search advertising, and as com-
mon to papers that initiate a new direction of study, this paper leaves out several important open problems
that deserve theoretical investigation and analysis. We discuss some of these interesting problems in the
following.
Budget Splitting Games(BSG): Abstracting the settings in Broad-Match Game can provide us with a rich
class of mutli-player games having compact representations. It should be interesting to study these games
and to consider the budget splitting/allocation scenarios beyond the currently prevailing models for spon-
sored search advertising, as well as, other interesting applications. Herebelow we provide an abstraction.
An instance of BSG is given by (N,M,E, B, V,O). N is the set of players, M is set of distinct type of
indivisible items and (N,M,E) is a bi-partite graph between the players and items wherein an (i, j) ∈ E iff
the player i ∈ N is interested in buying the item j ∈ M (i.e. i have a positive valuation for j). B = {Bi}i∈N
is the budget vector, Bi being the total budget of player i. V = {Vj}j∈M is the volume vector, Vj being
the total number of units of the item j for sale. Let |N| = N and |M| = M . O is an oracle that takes
as input (i, j) ∈ E and a set of budget values {Bn,j}n∈N−{i} and output the set of values Λj = O(N),
zj,0 = 0, zj,1, zj,2, . . . , zj,Λj = Vj , and C(i, j, λ), U(i, j, λ) for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λj − 1, to be interpreted
as follows: given that for all n ∈ N − {i}, the player n spends/allocates an amount Bn,j on the item j,
C(i, j, λ) and U(i, j, λ) respectively are the cost and the utility for each unit of the item if the player i
decides to buy zj,λ < Vi,j ≤ zj,λ+1 units of the item j. Each player has access to the oracle O. The strategy
of a player i is to split her budget across various items that is to choose the values {Bi,j}j∈M:(i,j)∈E such
that
∑
j∈M:(i,j)∈EBi,j ≤ Bi and correspondignly the number of units of the various items {Vi,j}j∈M:(i,j)∈E
with Vi,j ≤ Vj . The payoff of a player is the total utility it derives across all the items from their units she
bought as per her chosen strategy.
Note that this abstraction nicely captures the Broad-Match Game studied in the present paper wherein
an item is a keyword and a query of a keyword corresponds to a unit. The oracle O corresponds to the
Lemma 1. Further, by varying the properties satisfied by the values C(i, j, λ), U(i, j, λ)’s we may obtain
other interesting scenarios.
Complexity of Auctioneer’s Dilemma: The Theorem 9 leaves the auctioneer in a dilemma about whether
he should broad-match or not. If he could somehow predict which choice of broad match lead to a revenue
improvement for him and which not, he could potentially choose the ones leading to a revenue improvement.
This brings forth one of the big questions left open in this paper, that is of efficiently computing a BME /
ǫ-NE, if one exists, given a choice of broad match, as well as, to efficiently decide whether a given broad
match is revenue improving or not in the AdBM scenario.
Existence of pure NE/ǫ-NE/BME in Broad-Match Game: Despite some effort we have not been able to
show that a Broad-Match Game always admits pure NE or even ǫ-NE or BME. On the other hand we have
also not been able to construct examples where they do not exist. The problem arises from the fact that the
payoff funtions are discontinuous and not even quasi-concave. Therefore, the existing techniques or their
simple extensions do not seem to work. This calls for developing new techniques for proving the existence
of pure Nash equilibria and the complexity of deciding the existence in general, and for the Broad-Match
Game and BSGs in particular.
Quantifying the Effect of Broad-Match: As per various observations including Theorem 9 obtained in
the Section 5.4 we know that the the revenue of the autioneer and the social welfare could very well degrade
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by incorporating broad-match and it would be interesting to characterize the extent of such degradation.
Total Click-Through-Rates as Payoff: It would be interesting to analyze the effect of broad-match in a
scenario where the advertisers are interested in maximizing their total Click-Through-Rate across various
keywords rather than their total utilities. Note that the budget splitting game arising in this sceneario indeed
fits in our abtract model of BSG discussed earlier in this section. With the intuition developed from this paper,
we believe that similar conclusions hold true even in the case of total Click-Through-Rates as payoffs.
BME vs ǫ-NE: As we argued in the paper, both the BME and ǫ-NE are reasonable solution concepts
for the Broad-Match Game. Further, we constructed examples where the both solution concepts coincide.
Nevertheless, it would be nice to study these two concept comparatively at a finer level. For example, BME
may not provide good approximation guarantee to the advertisers but it demands less shophistication level
from them than that required for good approximation guarantee.
Network Level Competition via Broad-Match Game: The framework provided in the present paper
is easily applicable to the scenario where advertisers are trying to optimally split budgets across various
keywords coming from several competing search engines. How does the revenue of one search engine gets
effected by the fact that another competeting search engine offers broad-match? For example consider the
BMG in the Figure 9, without the dashed edge (3, 1), and suppose that the keyword 1 is coming from the
search engine 1 and the keyword 2 is coming from the serach engine 2. Now if the search engine 1 does
broad-match and introduces the new edge (3, 1) then we can see that the revenue of the search engine 1
increases whereas that of search engine 2 decreases. It should be interesting to further explore this direction.
Formalizing a Notion of “Good” Broad-Match: In the analysis we have presented, we have not con-
sidered costs incurred by the auctioneer in the short run due to uncertainty about the extended part of the
BMG, although we can expect that as long as the quality of broad match being performed is good, such costs
should be minimal. Nevertheless, formalizing a notion of good broad match should be interesting. Features
such as the improvement in the relevance scores and conversion rates should be an essential ingredient of
a good broad match. Further, the conditions noted in the Observation 13 also provides some sense of what
should be the features of a good broad-match from the viewpoint of the auctioneer.
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